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The impulse to make the nominating process more democratic has shaped the debate about 
party reform throughout its history. The creation of conventions, the rise of primaries, the 
efforts to make conventions and primaries more inclusive, the case for caucuses, the pleas of 
small states and large states, and the more recent criticism of front-loading—all have been 
justified in part by appeals to general principles of democracy, and encouraged by the 
assumption that more democracy is better.  
Both the reformers and their critics claim the mantle of democracy. Yet they have 
rarely paused to explain what conception of democracy they have in mind, or which  principles 
of democracy they are trying to realize. Political scientists have not done much better. They 
have usefully described and explained how the process works, and pointed out defects in the 
system and suggested ways to overcome them. But they have not analyzed the normative basis 
of their evaluations and recommendations. The editors’ introduction to the recent PS 
symposium simply lists four goals without justifying any of them.
1  The authors of another 
recent study in a section on “Unresolved Normative Questions” acknowledge that answering 
the questions “depend heavily on what one means by democracy,” but then conclude that this 
is “an issue we do not wish to take on.”
2 
It is understandable that political reformers and political scientists wish to avoid the 
hazards of theorizing about democracy. Theorists themselves do not agree about principles of 
democracy, or even about how to resolve disagreements about them. Moreover, much useful 
work can be done without invoking comprehensive theories of democracy or engaging in 
complex normative analysis. But the neglect of theory has a cost. Some important aspects of 
democracy do not receive the attention they deserve  by reformers, critics or political scientists. 
As a result, the agenda of the study and practice of nominating presidents is at best incomplete 
and at worst misconceived. The primary purpose of primaries—evaluating the candidates—
deserves greater and different attention than it usually receives. 
 
THE NEED FOR NORMATIVE THEORY 
When Robert LaFollette made the direct primary a centerpiece of his gubernatorial campaign 
in 1900, he expressed a principle that has framed the debates about the nominating process 
ever since: “the sovereign right that each citizen shall for himself exercise his choice by direct 
vote, without the intervention or interference of any political agency.”
3 On one side of the - 2 - 
debate (in the spirit of LaFollette’s principle), the process is said to be more democratic to the 
extent that it is more inclusive: that is, to the extent that the party’s rank and file have more 
control over the choice, and those who have control are representative of the party’s 
supporters.  This remains the dominant view because the pressure toward inclusion is difficult 
to resist; greater inclusion in decision making is simply what more democracy means to many 
people. “Each major step in the development of the nominating process has marked a further 
obeisance to the doctrine that the will of the rank and file of party membership should 
prevail.”
4  
On the other side, the critics of the movement toward greater inclusion can also appeal 
to democratic principle. They argue that letting the party leaders have more control is in the 
interest of voters not only in the party but in the electorate as a whole. The leaders are more 
likely to choose candidates who will be more competitive in the general election and thus give 
all voters greater choice. “The sovereignty of the voter consists in his freedom of choice just as 
the sovereignty of the consumer in the economic system consists in his freedom to trade in a 
competitive market… Democracy is not to be found in the parties but between the parties.”
5  
These contrasting views about the importance of inclusion (how participatory the 
process should be) played themselves out in the debates about direct primaries, the McGovern 
Fraser Commission in 1969-70 and more recently in the controversy about the role of super-
delegates in 2008. Advocates on each side could claim that they support both values; more 
participation can produce more competition, and more competition can encourage 
participation. But the two values do not always go happily together, and when choices must be 
made, their advocates show their conceptual colors. They give greater weight to one over the 
other in both their rhetoric and their practical proposals. They are guided by different 
conceptions of democracy.   
The contrasting conceptions of democracy and their different implications present 
raise important questions that deserve further analysis. Why should parties control the 
nominating process themselves? (The constitution and the courts send mixed messages about 
this question, and in any case should not be considered the final authority on the principles of 
democracy.) If the key principle is participatory, should all primaries be open to all voters? 
Are caucuses less democratic because they are less representative, or more democratic because 
they permit more active participation by those who attend? Is a national primary more 
justifiable because turnout is higher or are regional primaries preferable because they give 
citizens more information? On either competitive or participatory conceptions, we should 
question whether democracy requires equality among the states. Even in a federal system, the 
primary value is the individual citizen. Fairness to the states is a principle that must ultimately 
must rest on the value of fairness to individuals.  
A more complete normative analysis of the process would try to clarify the implications 
of these two conceptions, resolve differences if possible, and identify issues that could be 
illuminated by further research. Rather than pursuing this broader project, I concentrate here - 3 - 
on only one normative principle—choosing the best candidate— partly because it expresses a 
goal that has received less attention in the controversies about the nomination process. It is 
also a principle that in a sense is prior to the others. The primary purpose of primaries is to 
select nominees; participation and competition are mainly (though of course not exclusively) 
means to that end. Most significantly, if we focus on that end, we can recognize a further 
distinctive way in which the process can be made more democratic. The nominating process is 
more democratic to the extent that it enables voters to select candidates who are committed to 
the democratic process.  
 
THE CHARACTER OF THE NOMINEES 
Neither the familiar conceptions of democracy nor the usual discussions of reforms of the 
process emphasize this goal because they tend to focus on who makes the choices rather than 
who is chosen. Participation and competition receive nearly all of the attention. Yet on any 
conception of democracy or any proposal for reform, the quality of the nominees—more 
specifically their character—should be a chief concern. It should be especially prominent in 
evaluating the primary process. It might even be considered the distinctive purpose of the 
process. By the time the general election arrives, the range of choices has been practically 
narrowed to two, and most voters decide on the basis of attitudes or views they held before the 
campaign. In that sense, the nominating process is the last clear chance for most voters to 
make choices based on the character of the candidates. A key question, then, should be how 
well does the process allow citizens to judge their character. 
The influence of the process on character was recognized more than a century ago by 
political scientist Henry Jones Ford:  
All that the direct primary, or any other political reform, can do is to affect the character 
of the politicians by altering the conditions that govern political activity, thus 
determining its extent and quality. The direct primary may take advantage and 
opportunity from one set of politicians and confer them upon another set, but 
politicians there will always be so long as there is politics. The only thing that is open to 
control is what sort of politicians we shall have.
6  
Ford’s comment is repeatedly quoted by contemporary political scientists presumably 
because it anticipates the view that reforms intended to increase rank and file control of the 
nomination process usually only result in replacing one elite with another.
7 Because this 
smartly cynical observation resonates so strongly with many contemporary observers and 
political scientists, the other more subtle point Ford made has been neglected. The process may 
not affect who chooses but it can influence who is chosen —the “sort of politicians we shall 
have.” Ford does not say exactly what alterations in the conditions he thinks affect character of 
politicians, or what qualities of character are relevant, but he clearly identifies a key question 
we should ask about the nominating process—how well it reveals the character of the 
candidates.  - 4 - 
Party leaders do not completely ignore character in choosing nominees or making 
party rules. But they understandably focus on those aspects of character that serve the interest 
of the party more than the purposes of the democratic process. They argue about whether it is 
more important to choose a candidate who is reliably loyal (and appeals to the base) or a 
candidate who independent-minded (and more attractive to independents and moderates). If 
they consider the kind of character they would like to see in the other party’s nominee, they 
may prefer to see more vices than virtues; the less admirable the character of the rival nominee 
looks in comparison with their own nominee, the better.  
But from the perspective of the citizen (and the good of the democratic process), the 
character of the candidates of both parties are equally important. Citizens who will have to live 
under the government of one or the other of the nominees should care as much about the 
nominee of the party they oppose as the nominee of the party they support.  Unless they can be 
confident that their preferred candidate will win, they should want both parties to nominate 
the best possible presidential candidate. The importance of considering the character of both 
nominees can be further brought out by distinguishing two perspectives on the democratic 
process—that of voter and subject. As voters, citizens may and typically should express their 
partisan preferences. As subjects, citizens should  and typically do accept the authority of their 
elected leaders. (The basic distinction comes from Rousseau, but in his version the citizen as 
sovereign (the voter) should decide on the basis of the general will, not factional interests.
8) It 
is the perspective of a subject that is most relevant in the design of the nominating process 
(and the electoral system as a whole). As subjects, we should seek a process that produces 
leaders of good character whatever their partisan views and political positions. That is why we 
should want the nominating process of both parties to encourage assessments of the character 
of nominees, and on the basis of criteria that all citizens could accept. 
However, it will be immediately objected that any criteria for evaluating character 
surely depend on your partisan preferences and policy views. You may value loyalty most of 
all, and I may favor boldness; even if we both think both are important, you may put more 
weight on one than the other. Or both of us may prefer a president who shares our policy 
views even if his character falls short.  Judgments about competence or intelligence seem to be 
similarly tied to views on policy. Except for a few minimal qualifications (the nominee should 
be able to state truthfully “I am not a crook”), any distinctive set of qualities is arguably 
partisan or at least contestable. Loyalty may be associated with support for partisan purity, for 
example; boldness, with progressive reform. Citizens should not be expected to agree on any 
set of qualities, so the objection goes, regardless of which party they belong to or which 
candidate they favor on policy grounds.   
The objection may partly explain why theorists and reformers tend to focus on the 
participatory and competitive criteria for evaluating the nominating process. Even political 
scientists who recognize that the quality of nominees is relevant to assessing the process end 
up using criteria that are essentially those of the participatory and competitive conceptions. - 5 - 
For example: “quality candidates should be representative of their party and able to win in the 
general election;” the process should “level the playing field at the beginning in terms of money 
and access to voters and media.”
9 A process that satisfied these criteria might well produce 
better candidates or at least reduce the chances of those whose support depends on only 
money and prior recognition. But these criteria are at best indirect ways of evaluating whether 
the process enables citizens to assess the character of candidates. They remain neutral on what 
is to count as quality—what kind of character the process should seek—and therefore give 
little guidance in evaluating the extent to which the process provides opportunities for 
assessing the right kind of character.   
 
 
THE CHARACTER OF CANDIDATES 
Is it possible to find a more substantive principle or set of criteria that could serve this 
purpose? I propose that we consider a principle that would judge the process by how well it 
shows whether candidates themselves respect the democratic process. The idea is that the 
process can be democratic not only in how it treats those who choose, but also in what it 
reveals about those who are chosen. The principle affirms that a process is in this sense more 
democratic to the extent that it enables citizens to judge a candidate’s commitment to the 
democratic process, or lack thereof. In addition, it suggests that the process is more democratic 
to the extent that it enables candidates to strengthen that commitment during the campaign. 
On this approach the other principles such as participation and competition play a different 
role: how the candidates deploy the principles become part of the test of their character. 
What should we look for in judging a candidate’s commitment to the democratic 
process? I suggest that we should care most about those qualities make up what may be called 
constitutional character. This refers to the disposition to act, and motivate others to act, 
according to the principles that constitute the democratic process.  It does not refer primarily 
to personal character. The personal vices that too often interest the media—most often sexual 
misconduct—are rarely relevant, or not as relevant as the attention they get implies.  Private 
vice combined with public virtue is not uncommon in the character of politicians.
10 
No doubt there are many personal qualities that would help a president use the 
democratic process as well— for example, courage, compassion, loyalty. But even these take a 
different form in public than in private life. Loyalty to friends, for example, is more likely to be 
a vice than a virtue in governing. Constitutional virtues are different: they are specific to public 
office, either because they take a different form in public life or because the occasion for their 
exercise does not arise in private life. (“Constitutional” does not refer to the document itself, 
but to the broader understanding of what is required of officials for the democratic process to 
work well in the U.S.) Elsewhere I have discussed the content of these virtues and episodes in 
which presidents showed or failed to show constitutional character.
11 Here I briefly describe 
only four of those virtues for the purpose of illustrating how the primary process can reveal - 6 - 
constitutional character.  None is morally or politically neutral, and interpretations of each 
may well provoke partisan and ideological disagreement, but their essential content should be 
acceptable to anyone who is committed to the democratic process.  
Capability for Collaboration. An essential prerequisite of the democratic process is the 
existence of a vigorous opposition, which in turn requires a disposition  not only to tolerate but 
work with political opponents.
 12  A collaborative leader facilitates that compromise that a 
robust democratic process requires. This virtue includes the willingness to engage with diverse 
groups of citizens, to respond constructively to criticism, rise above factional interests, and 
actively to seek opportunities for cooperation with their opponents. Its opposite is revealed in 
the extreme partisanship and political polarization of the kind that has marked national politics 
in the U.S. in recent years. In the primary, this vice is most clearly revealed when candidates 
put their own will to win ahead of the good of the party, and when they direct their appeals 
only to a narrow range of interests.  
Sense of Responsibility. Like leaders of any large organization, responsible presidents 
should be accountable for the failures of their subordinates. They should “take responsibility” 
for major mistakes—but not in the ritualistic way that this practice is commonly carried out.
13 
Taking responsibility does not show a sense of responsibility if no consequences follow for 
those who take it. Constitutional character calls for a sense of responsibility that results in 
effective actions before and after the “taking.” The actions may include the dismissal of high 
level subordinates, independent investigations, and institutional reforms to prevent similar 
mistakes in the future. More generally, responsible presidents give reasons for their actions 
and omissions. In a primary a candidate can demonstrate this virtue by taking responsibility 
for the failures of staff, and by publicly justifying decisions the campaign makes.  
Respect for Due Process. As the presidency has grown more powerful, presidents have 
become bolder in pursuing their ends with means that may formally follow the constitution but 
flout its spirit. They are tempted to use executive power in ways that disregard established 
procedures, and usurp the rights of others.  It is therefore all the more important that the 
president have a respect for due process in the broadest sense. This virtue includes a 
disposition to follow the spirit as well as the letter of procedures that have been agreed upon, 
respect the rights of legitimate authorities, support fair processes for resolving disputes, 
making changes and engaging in competition. In a primary, candidates can show their 
commitment to process by abiding by the party rules, or by challenging the rules in a manner 
that is generally regarded as fair. The strategies favored by their campaign managers often 
provide a telling clue: do they welcome fair play and open competition, or do they prefer dirty 
tricks and devious intrigue? 
Commitment to Candor. Candor is the pre-eminent virtue of the democratic process 
because it is the pre-requisite for discovering the other virtues and vices of the president and 
his associates. We cannot hold officials accountable for these other vices and other misconduct 
if they deceive us about what they are doing. But even with respect to the virtue of candor, we - 7 - 
still need to be selective in what we require of leaders. One reason to be discriminating is that 
presidential deception is occasionally justified, and presidential evasion sometimes required. 
Constitutional character does not abjure either absolutely, and therefore includes the capacity 
to discern when each is and is not warranted. In primaries, blatant lies, at least those that can 
be proved, are probably rare simply because they are readily exposed, usually to the 
candidate’s disadvantage. Other failures of candor are more common and perhaps more telling: 
for example, vagueness or equivocation on a controversial issue. Those can be all too readily 
detected in some primary campaigns.  
Some may question whether we can learn much of anything from what the candidates 
do and say during a campaign. Candidates have incentives to appear at their best and to avoid 
uncontroversial positions on issues.  They may behave quite differently and take different 
positions once in office. They may say “read my lips: no new taxes” in the campaign and then 
support a tax increase in office. Indeed, it is reasonable to ask whether campaigns are a good 
way to select leaders at all. We do not use campaigns or even elections to choose leaders of 
most of the other large private institutions that govern our lives—corporations, hospitals, 
universities, the media. The same is true of appointments in government and other public 
institutions where the competence of the leader is critical. Perhaps it would be possible to hold 
elections without campaigns. A citizens’ search committee that would vet the candidates, 
narrow the field, and make recommendations to voters might well produce more accurate and 
useful information than do campaigns as we know them. But the legitimacy of such a 
committee (or any other body serving in this role) would always be in doubt, and to that extent 
so would the legitimacy of the leader who emerged from this process.   
For good or for ill we have campaigns, and we have to make the best of them. 
Although they may not be the most reliable predictor of performance in office, they can 
provide some useful indicators if properly structured. They may be more useful for evaluating 
the character of candidates than their positions on issues. Positions on issues can and 
sometimes should change, as circumstances change and as new issues arise. Character is more 
stable and less likely to change in office. Furthermore, candidates inevitably reveal aspects of 
constitutional character in how they run their campaigns—the kind of people they appoint, the 
style of management they adopt, the attitude they take toward opponents. Running a campaign 
is not of course the same as governing, but it is more like governing than taking positions on 
issues. To the extent that primary campaigns can be made better instruments for testing 
constitutional character, they could become a more useful device for evaluating candidates.   
 
 
THE CHARACTER OF THE PROCESS 
What kind of primary process would better enable citizens to assess, and candidates to 
demonstrate, constitutional character? The most general requirement is that the process should 
provide opportunities for learning by both voters and candidates. It should allow and - 8 - 
encourage preferences to change over time. This important point about the dynamic potential 
of primaries has been lost in the controversy about alternative explanations for candidates’ 
success in primaries. The dominant view among political scientists has been that momentum is 
the major factor (at least if one of the candidates is relatively unknown). For example, if a 
candidate does “better than expected” in Iowa and New Hampshire, he gains disproportionate 
media attention and financial support, which translates into ultimate victory.
14 More recently, 
some scholars have challenged this explanation, suggesting that endorsements from major 
groups aligned with the party are more important in most races.
15  
The focus on the question of whether the party elite or the rank and file are more 
influential has obscured a more fundamental property of the primary process as it currently 
exists. Stretched out in time and dispersed in space, primary voting permits and even 
encourages voters to change their preferences. Whether under the influence of the media, 
party elite, or their own deliberation, voters at each stage can take into account information 
and opinion generated at earlier stages and in other places. Although Bartels put forward what 
has been called the “canonical” statement of the momentum explanation,
16 he was just as 
concerned to emphasize the dynamic nature of the process, specifically to challenge the 
assumption that preferences are fixed (a view he attributed to classical public choice theory). 
His most general aim was to bring out the implications of the fact that voters’ preferences 
change during the primary campaigns in response to other people’s preferences and opinions 
(including general expectations about candidates’ chances). In his view, the most important 
normative implication (“the unresolved normative issue”) is whether the collective choice of 
the nominee should follow the “unsocialized preferences” (opinions that exist before the 
process begins) or “socialized preferences” (opinions shaped by the interactions during the 
process).
17 Any campaign will socialize preferences to some degree, but the more normative 
weight given to socialized preferences, the more important it is that the process provides 
opportunities for the right kind of socialization. The character-based principle I am proposing 
for assessing the process implies that the socialized preferences should have greater weight, 
and therefore that the dynamic properties of the process—the opportunities for the right kind 
of preference change—are critical to evaluating it.   
To allow for such preference change, the process should be sequential rather than 
simultaneous , and intervallic rather than concentrated. A primary process should be designed 
so that candidates compete in multiple contests in different states and regions over time and so 
that the individual primaries are sufficiently separated in time to permit political learning. Such 
a process has a number of benefits, but here I concentrate on those that bear on the assessment 
of constitutional character.  
 
SIMULTANEOUS V. SEQUENTIAL PRIMARIES 
Public opinion consistently favors a single national primary. Some political scientists agree.
18 A 
national primary would have important advantages. It would treat all states equally, increase - 9 - 
turnout, and reduce costs.  All voters would have the same information as in the general 
election (to the extent that the latter is simultaneous).
19 But the reform favored by most 
political scientists and most politicians is some version of sequential regional contests. There 
are many variations (the Texas, Ohio, Michigan, Delaware Plans and the proposal of the 
National Association of Secretaries of State).
20 All are designed to give more states and more 
interests a greater opportunity to influence the outcome.  
The most obvious political appeal of the plans is that they treat more states and more 
groups equally. But normative significance of that feature is less clear: states and groups are 
not individuals, and the effect on equality of citizens is ambiguous. The more definite 
normative value lies in the sequential character of the process. A series of primaries provides 
opportunities for the candidates to demonstrate their commitment to the democratic process, 
or lack thereof. They have more opportunities to be tested, and in a greater variety of settings. 
Social scientists have often cited information gains as a benefit of sequential elections, and 
most of these plans would contribute to that goal as well.
21  
The sequential property is no less important for learning about and developing 
constitutional character. Positions on issues can in principle be presented and debated before a 
single election, and indeed voters might even be more likely to absorb the information if they 
have to pay attention to a single election rather than a series. But character is not something 
that can be presented in a statement or a pledge. It has to be observed in context, and it is 
more effectively observed in a variety of contexts over time. This is all the more true of 
constitutional character because its virtues are process-related, and can be more clearly 
revealed in a process that is ongoing. Thus the character-based principle adds a further 
consideration in favor of sequential primaries. Even if it points toward the same conclusion as 
some other principles suggest, the perspective it provides is distinctive. Because it is not based 
on fairness to states or general information gain, it directs attention to specific features of the 
process that other approaches based on other principles tend to neglect. It emphasizes the need 
to create opportunities for testing the candidates’ commitment to the democratic process.   
Consider the constitutional virtue of candor. Complete candor is hardly an absolute 
rule in a candidate’s playbook. Some evasion may be competitively necessary and even 
justified. Yet some candidates seem to do better than others in navigating a course between 
self-destructive outspokenness and devious equivocation. Political scientists have tried to 
explain why some candidates are more evasive or vague than others.
 22 Carter in 1976, Bush in 
1980 and Hart in 1984 were more often charged with “fuzziness” (deliberate issue ambiguity) 
than were other candidates at the time. The best explanations appear refer to the strategic 
advantage that equivocation gives less well known candidates. At first voters have less 
information about these candidates and their positions on issues, and can “project” their own 
views on to the candidates, as long the candidates do not say anything too specific. But as the 
process continued and the emerging contender is forced to become more explicit, he begins to 
“pay a price for his new familiarity in the form of more critical, more realistic, scrutiny of his - 10 - 
issues stands.”
23 In this way, a sequential process, spread out over time and space, encourages a 
kind of candor, or at least discourages a campaign of permanent equivocation.    
The capacity to appreciate and communicate with citizens with diverse interests—an 
aspect of the collaborative virtue—can also be more readily observed in a sequential primary. 
The President is president of all the people, and the candidates should be prepared to engage 
with citizens from all regions and groups. It might seem at first that a national primary would 
be a better test of that capacity, but national campaigns tend  toward homogenization; they are 
more likely to emphasize issues and appeals that are held widely and downplaying regional and 
special interests. They usually reveal less about how leaders will deal with particular interests, 
both those that merit attention and those that do not. In a series of primaries in different states 
(even if front-loaded) candidates confront particular interests, and all voters—not only those 
in the state in question—can see how they deal with the diversity.  
The issue of ethanol, which excites Iowans more than most other voters, has given 
candidates a chance to show how they handle particular interests. Facing the Iowa caucuses, 
both McCain and Hilary Clinton abandoned their long standing opposition to ethanol 
subsidies. They both provided explanations, which were not entirely without merit.  Both said 
that circumstances had changed, and the nation needs to exploit every possible source of 
renewable energy. However, expert opinion, which generally takes a less favorable view of the 
potential of ethanol, had not changed, and many voters were understandably suspicious. The 
point is not that a caucus or primary in one state can better expose political hypocrisy, only 
that it can better test candidates’ capacity to justify their positions when they face audiences 
with different and conflicting interests. The contrast between particular and general interests is 
usually less vivid and more easily finessed in a national campaign.  
In a sequential process, a candidate has the opportunity to decide in which states to 
compete, and the decision itself tells us something about the willingness to engage with 
diversity. Does a candidate decide to compete in a variety of states or only in friendly states? 
Al Gore in 1988 and Rudy Giuiliani in 2008 calculated that they could do better in the later 
primaries where voters’ views more closely matched theirs, and therefore decided to avoid 
Iowa and New Hampshire where voters’ attitudes seemed less sympathetic to a Southerner or 
a big city mayor with culturally liberal leanings.
24 As it turned out, skipping these tests not only 
reflected poorly on their constitutional character but also cast doubt on their strategic 
judgment. Here as in many cases, character and judgment go together.  
 
CONCENTRATED V. DISPERSED  PRIMARIES 
One of the most troublesome trends in the primary process is what has been called front 
loading—the scheduling of more primaries soon after the formal opening of the nomination 
process with the result that the nominee is effectively chosen by the middle of March.
25 The 
Obama-Clinton contest in 2008 is the only recent exception, and it did not put to rest other 
concerns about front-loading, such as the “very high fundraising entry fee” and the premature - 11 - 
elimination of “serious and well-qualified candidates.”
26 Many people also complained that this 
primary went on too long, testing not so much the character of the candidates as the patience 
of the public.  But the problem is not the length of the campaign. A shorter process would not 
be as useful for assessing constitutional character. The problem lies in the temporal structure 
of the process—concentrating rather the dispersing the primaries. The primary process may be 
sequential but if the contests are concentrated the process is for several reasons less suitable 
for assessing character.  
First, a front-loaded concentrated process increases the influence of the “invisible 
primary,” the period before the first primary when candidates raise funds, collect 
endorsements, take polls, and recruit consultants and staff, and generally try to become better 
known, preferably as one of the front runners.
27 The candidates’ success in this “primary” often 
substantially determines their chances in the real primaries that follow. If the real primaries all 
take place at the beginning of the season, this invisible primary becomes the campaign that 
matters. The problem is that it is a campaign that most voters and even the media do not see. 
Whatever the invisible primary could reveal about character remains hidden from most voters.  
Second, the intervals between the primaries must be sufficiently long to allow both 
voters and candidates to absorb the new information that the process generates. One 
calculation suggests that for voters at least three weeks is necessary.
28 Voters need time to 
process any kind of information, but the need is even greater for information about 
constitutional character. Candidates’ attitudes toward the democratic process can often be 
evaluated only by combining information from several different episodes (a process by its 
nature is continual). Interpreting these multiple data points takes time.  
Third, a dispersed process gives candidates a chance to correct their earlier errors, 
providing a more balanced view of their character, and perhaps even allowing them to learn 
lessons that may influence how they govern. During the early part of the campaign in 2007, 
Obama was showing a tendency to blame staff for campaign mistakes. When he failed to 
appear for a key meeting with union leaders before the New Hampshire primary, he told the 
organizers that his staff had made a mistake in scheduling. A month later he blamed staff for a 
derogatory memo about Hilary Clinton, and for another memo about Clinton’s allegedly racial 
remarks that was circulated to South Carolina media outlets.
29 Some observers pointed to an 
“emerging pattern” of avoiding responsibility.
30 Finally in January, during one of the debates, 
Obama took responsibility himself: “And it is my responsibility to make sure that we’re setting 
a clear tone in our campaign, and I take that responsibility very seriously, which is why I 
spoke yesterday and sent a message in case people were not clear that what we want to do is 
make sure that we focus on the issues.”
31 By the time he was in office, he had learned the 
lesson, at least a lesson of how to talk about responsibility. After his nominee for Secretary of 
Health and Human Services was forced to withdraw because of ethics problems, Obama said: 
“I consider this a mistake on my part and one I intend to fix and correct and make sure we 
don’t screw it up again.”
32 In all of these incidents, the staff or associates made the mistakes in - 12 - 
the first place, but an important requirement of a constitutional leader is the willingness to take 
responsibility for the mistakes of his subordinates. Taking responsibility should not be merely 
rhetorical but must be accompanied by effective action such as changing management 
practices or making difficult personnel decisions. 
 
CLOSE ENCOUNTERS: IOWA AND NEW HAMPSHIRE 
In a sequential primary, even with appropriate intervals between each contest, some states will 
go before others, and will have a greater chance to influence the race at critical moment (for 
example, by creating momentum for an underdog, reducing the chances of the favorite, setting 
the agenda for later contests). Why should Iowa and New Hampshire always enjoy this 
privilege? Neither state deliberately decided to go first for strategic reasons. New Hampshire 
has held the first in the nation primary since 1920, but no one paid attention until 1949 when 
delegates were permitted to identify with one of the candidates, initiating the first presidential 
preference primary. Even then, other states did not care much because the early contests did 
not have significant effects. Iowa’s caucuses became the first event on the primary calendar in 
1972 simply because of the time needed to go through the state’s multi stage selection process 
leading up to the convention. But after Jimmy Carter’s unexpected success in 1976, which was 
made possible only by his early victories in these first two states, the complaints about their 
privileged position grew more clamorous.   
Critics argue that granting any state this privilege is unfair, and that because these 
states are unrepresentative of the nation as a whole, their influence biases the agenda and 
potentially the final result of the campaign. Issues of greater interest to urban voters and 
minorities, for example, are likely to receive less attention. The caucuses themselves are also 
said to be unrepresentative because only a relatively small number of people participate 
(typically those who are highly motivated and have more flexible schedules).
33 Although there 
were efforts to dethrone the Iowa and New Hampshire (the Carter White House even 
supported one of the first and most serious attempts), they have doggedly held on to their 
position. Their politicians cared more about being first than about losing delegates (the only 
penalty the national parties have at their disposal). They simply cared more about their 
position than did the politicians in other states, and were willing to play hardball to keep it. As 
one commentator put it: “What they do, in effect, is blackmail the candidates.”
34 
Is there any reason other than the “pragmatic argument” (“just concede the 
inevitable”) to continue to let these states go first? From the perspective of participatory 
democracy, its distinctive advantage is that it facilitates face to face politics with genuine 
interactions instead of the media driven politics typical in the other states. New Hampshire 
does not have official caucuses but the informal events that have become common in the state 
serve a similar purpose. Even if (as some evidence indicates) most voters in both of these states 
still get most of their information from television,
35 they have access to reports about the 
discussions in the caucuses. Voters do not have to be present to benefit from what can be - 13 - 
learned from the caucuses. Even voters in other states can vicariously profit from this 
information, and from any lessons the candidates themselves learn. The most comprehensive 
recent study of the Iowa caucuses concludes that they do in fact facilitate “the give-and-take of 
retail politics,” encouraging real debate on the issues, and forcing candidates to build 
grassroots coalitions. The caucus process evidently limits the impact of negative campaigning 
and the influence of advertising dollars.
36 Furthermore, another recent study shows that Iowa 
voters are in many respects actually typical of the rest of the electorate in many respects.
37 
These general advantages translate into specific contributions to the task of judging 
constitutional character. Voters and vicarious participants are probably better able to assess 
character in face to face relations than in more distant, mediated encounters. Psychological 
studies generally find that people are not very good at detecting deception, certainly not as 
good as they think, but to the extent that they are successful, they take advantage of a wider 
range personal cues, including nonverbal behavior.
38 If people are better able to assess 
truthfulness in personal interactions, then caucuses and similar settings would appear to be 
more useful for assessing the constitutional virtue of candor. It is reasonable to assume that 
candidates are more likely to reveal a tendency to shade the truth in such settings than in 
media presentations, which are more vulnerable to manipulation and less open to interaction 
among the participants. Caucuses can be manipulated too, but they can be more readily 
modified in ways that could serve as better tests of candor.   
The implication is not of course that all states should now institute caucuses. It is 
simply that those states that have a traditions of this kind of “retail” politics should be allowed 
to maintain their potentially influential place in the primary process. The present calendar is 
not the only way to preserve that advantage, however. The Delaware Plan (favored by the 
RNC in 2000 but defeated at the last minute), which ensures that small states would always go 
first, may serve the purpose as well.
39 Nor are in-person meetings always necessary. The key 
factor is interaction, and this can be accomplished virtually. Some recent experiments with 
internet communication between constituents and their representatives show that meaningful 
dialogue can be achieved through virtual town meetings.
40  
 
PLAYING BY THE RULES: SUPERDELEGATES, ROBOTS AND PREMATURE PRIMARIES  
The disputes that periodically erupt about the rules of the primaries and conventions offer 
opportunities for insight into the candidates’ attitude toward democracy, specifically their 
respect for due process in the broad sense. Most of the time the public does not pay much 
attention to these disputes but they can be important not only because how they are resolved 
affects the outcomes, but also because how they are handled by the candidates opens a window 
on constitutional character. In the most recent Democratic primary, a dispute about the rules 
did move to center stage in the campaign. Two rules that had been of interest only to party 
insiders— the provision for appointing superdelegates to the convention, and the rule for - 14 - 
imposing sanctions on states that scheduled their primary earlier than allowed by the national 
party—attracted wide attention as the competition for delegates intensified.  
Representing about 20 percent of the votes at the convention, super-delegates gain 
their seats by virtue of their current or former positions as party or elected officials. Some are 
also appointed by the state parties during the primary.
 41  None may be pledged to any 
candidate in advance. The role of superdelegate was created in 1982 by the Hunt Commission 
partly in reaction to the effects of previous rule changes that had been intended to make the 
convention more responsive to the results of the primaries. In the eyes of the party leaders, the 
changes had succeeded all too well, and were producing less electable candidates like 
McGovern who appealed more to the base of the party than to the general electorate. The 
official purpose, as stated by Chairman Hunt, was more general: “to give our convention more 
flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and in cases where the voters’ mandate is less 
than clear, to make reasoned choice.”
42 Party leaders, the commission believed, would have 
more (and more up to date) information and experience, and would therefore be better judges 
of who would make the better candidate, which in practical terms meant the candidate who 
would be strongest in the general election. A few party leaders, notably Jesse Jackson, 
objected that the role of superdelegates is an undemocratic device because it allows an elite to 
overturn the will of the party rank and file.
43 He had a point: he was appealing to the principle 
that the more inclusive body should have the ultimate authority, a principle that Obama would 
also later invoke. But his objection was mostly ignored, and the issue remained dormant 
because, as the primaries played out from 1984 to 2008, the front runner’s lead was great 
enough early enough to make the superdelegates irrelevant.  
All that changed in 2008. By mid February 2008 when nearly 70 percent of delegates 
had been pledged to either Obama or Clinton, the difference between their totals was slim. 
Clinton supporters saw the superdelegates as essential to their victory. “I believe that the 
superdelegates should do the same as any other delegate or voter, which is to determine who 
they believe will be the best President.”
44 She was following the rules in the sense that she was 
appealing to the original understanding of the purpose of super-delegates. “Best candidate for 
president” would have been a more accurate description of the original aim, but on either 
interpretation she was invoking perfectly legitimate democratic principles, either that parties 
should choose the person who would make the best president for all citizens, or the person 
who would make the most competitive candidate in the general election. For his part, Obama 
insisted that the will of the majority of voters should prevail, not the decisions of an unelected 
elite. This was a version of a principle of equal votes that Jackson had earlier invoked and 
Clinton would soon use for a different purpose. If the Clinton attempt succeeded, it would be, 
as one Obama supporter put it, “a coup by superdelegate—the overturning of the popular 
results by the party elite.”
45  
Both candidates were appealing to valid principles of the democratic process, but in 
this instance Clinton had the stronger case on the merits. If there are good democratic reasons - 15 - 
on both sides in a dispute about an ongoing process, the more justifiable position is the one 
that has been adopted in advance. That is part of what respect for a process means, part of the 
broader idea of democratic due process.  If Obama’s supporters had argued only that the 
superdelegates should use their legitimate discretion to conclude that all things considered the 
primary results should prevail, he would have been on stronger ground. Although some of 
their complaints could be read in that way, the campaign usually stated the objection quite 
generally, claiming that the use of any discretion by super-delegates is illegitimate. 
Playing by the rules is an important part of due process, but it does not mean that rules 
are desirable only because they have been agreed to. In 1976 the Democratic Party adopted 
what was later dubbed the “robot rule” requiring delegates to vote for the candidate to whom 
they were pledged at least on the first ballot at the convention.
46 Because the robot rule was 
agreed to in advance, delegates were obligated to observe it until it could be changed. But it is 
not an appropriate rule for the party or for the democratic process. The dynamic character of a 
campaign—the value of allowing voters and candidates to change their minds in response to 
changed circumstances and new information—points to the need to give delegates some 
discretion. The party leaders recognized this value in 1982 and softened the rule to allow 
delegates to vote “in all good conscience.”
47 This small change served a larger principle.  
Although the change was not expected to have much if any practical effect, the principle still at 
least symbolically reminds candidates that they should not treat delegates as “automata that 
mechanically record the preferences expressed by voters at home,”
48 but as autonomous party 
members whose loyalty must be won and kept by giving reasons that respond to changing 
circumstances and new information. It expresses the importance of the constitutional virtue of 
responsibility—here a commitment to accountability that goes beyond the expectation of 
loyalty. The symbol lasted until 2012. The  party’s Democratic Change Commission, taking a 
more mechanical view of what democracy requires, recommended that super-delegates no 
longer have this discretion. The Commission sought to “make the process more democratic by 
converting unpledged delegates to a pledged status that allocates them based on the results of 
statewide caucuses and primaries while continuing to recognize the important role these 
leaders play within our Party.”
49  
The other striking controversy about the rules in 2008 was also intensified by the 
closeness of the contest. In 2006, to prevent a race to the front of the calendar, the Democratic 
National Committee had stipulated that only four states could hold a primary event before 
February 5.  (In a token gesture toward diversity, Nevada and South Carolina were allowed to 
join New Hampshire and Iowa in the early contests.)  If a state violated this rule, it would lose 
50 per cent of its delegates at the convention.  Also for the first time, candidates who 
campaigned in the offending state would lose any delegates they might win there.
50 Michigan 
and Florida deliberately violated the rule, and selected a majority of delegates for Hillary 
Clinton. As the distance between the delegate counts narrowed, Clinton’s supporters realized 
that they could not win without Michigan and Florida. They demanded that the rule be waived - 16 - 
so that all the delegates could be seated. They appealed to a legitimate democratic principle of 
political equality, using the slogan familiar from the recount dispute in the 2000 election in 
Florida—“count every vote.”  
The appeal is indeed one that any good democrat could embrace; as a principle of 
equal votes it should have a prominent place in any democratic theory. Obama had invoked a 
variation of it in objecting to the potential intervention of superdelegates. But it was misplaced 
in this dispute about seating the delegates. Its appropriate place is in the process of rule-
making, where what counts as a vote is determined. Clinton would have had a more credible 
case had she raised her objection before or after the campaign. The Obama campaign had the 
stronger argument: the rule was clear and fair, and had been agreed to by all parties in 
advance. Any apparent unfairness arose only because two states pushed ahead of the others in 
violation of rules to which all had consented, and now one candidate was taking advantage of 
the violation.  
 By the end of May, the party leaders reached a tenable compromise (all the delegates 
from Florida and Michigan would be seated, but given only one-half vote each, and Obama 
would be given four extra votes from Michigan). Obama found it acceptable; it left him only 
66 delegates short of the nomination, with three primaries to go. Clinton supporters objected, 
and threatened to take the issue to party convention. But in the end both candidates accepted 
the compromise and in doing so, showed their willingness to put aside their own personal 
feelings and lingering animosities to work together for the good of the party. The cause in this 
case was partisan, but the collaborative spirit suggests a character trait that may be 
transferable to the larger cause of promoting the democratic process.  
 It is tempting to interpret the dispute about the rules as simply another example of 
politicians’ exploiting whatever principles serve their political interests at the time. Clinton 
appealed to a principle of equal participation when it served her in the dispute about seating 
Florida and Michigan, but was willing to set aside a very similar principle that would have 
denied a decisive role to the superdelegates. Obama favored equal participation when he was 
winning the primaries and caucuses, but was less enthusiastic about applying it to the 
participation of Michigan and Florida voters. The story is similar in most of the rules fights in 
both parties: candidates and their supporters fight for the rules that they expect to give them 
strategic advantage.
51 This is a conventional view of politics, and it is instructive as far as it 
goes. But as a general interpretation, it misses two important more subtle aspects of political 
conduct.  
First, in this case the candidates made principled appeals, and the principles were not 
only plausible but referred specifically to the democratic process. The candidates did not argue 
merely that they are the best candidate, more in tune with the party’s program, and better able 
to provide the leadership the party and nation needs. They made these substantive claims of 
course, but they also recognized that to deserve the nomination they had to win in a process 
that is fair, that they had to show respect for the fundamental principles of democracy. In this - 17 - 
way, they demonstrated their commitment to due process in the broad sense. More generally, 
to the extent that candidates make valid process arguments, they shape not only the current 
but also future campaigns. They create precedents and commitments that may have force in 
subsequent controversies, including those that they may face in office if elected. 
Second, in controversies in which there are reasonable claims on both sides, as in this 
episode, the candidates have an opportunity to demonstrate their capability for collaboration. 
Even when the compromise is in their long term political interest, as Clinton may have 
calculated in this case, the timing, style and attitude candidates exhibit as well as the content of 
the compromise they accept can reveal something about this constitutional character trait. If as 
is perhaps more often the case, the claims of one of the candidates is not reasonable, the other 
candidate should not be expected immediately to accept a compromise, but can demonstrate 
this constitutional virtue in a different way, by resisting the temptation to respond in kind, 
remaining open to an opponent’s overtures, and looking for new alternatives that might bridge 
the differences.  
Some of the most revealing conduct occurs not in the open violation of formal rules but 
in the disregard of informal norms of campaign practice. When candidates resort to dirty 
tricks, or refuse to condemn such practices, they give voters a reason to doubt their 
commitment to due process. Dirty tricks are especially tempting when a candidate who has 
been a front runner runs into trouble, as Bush did in 2000. Although starting strongly as the 
clear favorite of the party insiders, he lost New Hampshire to McCain. As he went into the 
South Carolina primary, the stakes were high. The contest there produced one of most 
notoriously dirty campaigns in recent history. Bush supporters spread false rumors about 
McCain, suggesting that he had fathered a black child, and that his wife used illegal drugs.  
Although no direct connection to the Bush campaign was ever proven, Bush and his aides 
never publicly attempted tried to stop the scurrilous attacks. Bush was present himself at one 
event when a speaker claimed that McCain did not care about veterans. When McCain tried to 
defend himself, the Bush campaign managed to portray McCain as the negative campaigner.
52 
Bush’s tactics could have served as an early warning of the Rovian machinations to come. The 
conduct of the campaign in this respect foreshadowed some of conduct of the Bush White 
House.  But McCain was not able to seize the opportunity to make this campaign moment a 
test of constitutional character, and therefore neither were the voters.  In 2004, in the same 
state, he failed—by his own admission— another test of constitutional character, equivocating 
on the issue of the removal of the Confederate flag from the Statehouse.
53 
   
 
THE VALUE OF THE HORSE RACE 
No criticism of campaigns has been more common than complaints about “horse race” 
coverage.
54 In general election campaigns, the media devote more time to the competition than 
to the content in the campaigns.
55 This imbalance is probably more common in primaries than - 18 - 
in general elections because the differences among the candidates on the issues is less.
56 
Contrary to the conventional criticism, horse race coverage can make a positive contribution to 
the democratic process. The right kind is useful in assessing the constitutional character of 
candidates, and especially useful in a primary where policy differences are less salient. To see 
its potential value, we need to distinguish several different types of horse race coverage—what 
may be called strategic, predictive, and motivational. The first two can be valuable if 
conducted in the right way; the third is more likely to be detrimental to the process.  
From the strategic type, which describes the plans and techniques of the campaigns 
and evaluates their relative success and failure, voters can learn something about the character 
of the candidates and their staff. How the candidates and their managers deal with opponents, 
respond to negative advertising, handle disputes within the campaign organization are all 
relevant to assessing constitutional character. Compared to reports on issue positions, stories 
about how the candidates make their strategic decisions may provide better indicators of the 
stable inclinations of the candidates and their associates. Because circumstances change, issue 
positions can and often should change in office, but the attributes of character revealed in 
strategic decisions usually persist. Whether candidates and their managers act as if winning is 
the only consideration or pay some attention to the needs of the democratic process, whether 
they respond to unfair attacks in kind or try to rise above them, whether they care about 
accuracy or only about what they can get away with—these and similar indicators are relevant 
for assessing constitutional character. Strategic decisions can be especially instructive about a 
candidate’s collaborative inclinations. In 1980 Reagan had built up strong support in the 
conservative base of the party, and might have won the nomination without reaching out to 
moderates. But he worked to “reposition himself not as the factional favorite of GOP 
conservatives but as the ‘natural standard bearer’ for Republicans of all stripes.”
57 Although 
the moderates were suspicious, Reagan in office continued to demonstrate an interest in 
collaboration, even while steering a distinctly conservative course on most policies. 
Predictive accounts cover which candidate is ahead, why voters are supporting the 
candidate, and whether the candidate is likely to keep the lead. Like strategic accounts, this 
type of coverage can contribute constructively to the dynamic quality of the campaign by 
providing voters and candidates with information that allow them to change their minds and 
adjust their plans. Undecided voters can learn how people in circumstances similar to theirs 
intend to vote. To the extent that the intentions reflect and the stories refer to assessments of 
constitutional character, accounts of the changing fortunes of the candidates give voters (and 
even candidates) valuable information. However, predictive coverage does not always take this 
form, and is therefore a less reliable tool than the strategic type. More commonly, the 
predictive approach leads to coverage that gives much greater attention to candidates who do 
better than expected, regardless of their actual standing. “The history of primary campaigns is 
dotted with famous examples of losers treated like winners (Eugene McCarthy in New 
Hampshire in 1968) and winners treated like losers (Edmund Muskie in New Hampshire in - 19 - 
1972).”
58 Neither the balance nor the content in this kind of coverage is helpful to voters who 
would wish to assess the character of the strongest candidates. 
The third type—motivational coverage—is the most problematic. It generally merits 
the opprobrium that the conventional criticism lays on all horse race reporting. In this kind of 
coverage, journalists speculate about what moves the candidates to take certain positions or 
adopt certain strategies. They do not take the candidates’ claims at face value, but look for the 
“real” motives that the candidates are reluctant to reveal.
59 They assume that the motives are 
always self-interested—”political” in the perjorative sense in which nothing matters except 
competitive advantage. This kind of coverage tends to reinforce the cynicism of voters and 
decrease their interest in politics.
60  
The motivational type of coverage also reinforces the least admirable inclinations of 
commentators and journalists. To write about motives in this way requires less thought than 
most other kinds of analysis. The journalist does not have to try to analyze the public reasons, 
which are usually complex, or the candidate’s actual conduct, which is often ambiguous. 
Journalists are not always wrong to be cynical, but they are usually wrong to be superficially 
cynical, which is the default attitude of too many. The motives of nearly all politicians are 
mixed, and some self-interested motives move them toward, not only away from, the public 
interest. To point out that a politician is politically motivated does not show much if anything 
about constitutional character. Self-interested motivation, especially if excessive, may be a sign 
of other character deficiencies: for example disregarding rules that are not to your advantage. 
But even here the focus should be on these deficiencies, not the motives. Even when motives 
are relevant for assessing constitutional character, they deserve more discriminating coverage 
than they usually receive.  
Critics of horse race coverage often urge journalists to be more responsible, and to 
treat the campaign more like a debate about substance than a contest of strategy.
61 The critics 
point to surveys that show that many voters say that they prefer substance over strategy. But 
the responses probably reflect more of what voters think they should say (their own sincere 
ideals) than what they actually do (their own actual behavior). The media would not continue 
to present so much horse race coverage if so many in their audiences did not consume it.
62 But 
if we continue to try to lecture the media, we should at least direct the criticism against a more 
precise target. We should encourage horse race coverage that provides information relevant to 
assessing the candidates in a balanced way and discourages the coverage that does not. Focus 
not on what makes the horses run, but on what the race shows about the character of the 
horses and their trainers.  
 
DEBATES AS TESTS OF CHARACTER 
In general election campaigns, televised debates probably do not usually change most voters’ 
preferences.
 63 Views about who won a debate are largely shaped by prior preferences. Debates 
may increase the political knowledge of the less informed but have less effect on the well - 20 - 
informed.
64 Still, a survey of 18 studies of recent debates concludes that they have some 
significant effects, especially on the salience of issues.
65 Although the evidence about their 
effects in primary campaigns is more limited, it is reasonable to assume that they are more 
influential than those in the general election because the candidates differ less on the issues and 
primary voters are more attentive.
66 There is, moreover, some evidence that primary debates 
significantly effect voters’ judgment about the character of the candidates (though the studies 
define “character” more broadly than used here).
67 Primary debates may be an 
underappreciated tool for assessing constitutional character. Properly designed and skillfully 
moderated, they can expose differences in candidates’ attitudes toward the democratic process 
especially by showing how they treat one another in a confrontational setting. The explicit 
comparisons that are possible when candidates face one other before a common audience bring 
out differences in the way they deal with challenges, controversies, and personal insults.   
In recent years, the debates in both parties have featured all the candidates—often as 
many as eight at each event. This bountiful offering does not create the most conducive format 
for encouraging a sustained discussion of the issues or for showing substantive differences 
between the leading candidates. Some observers therefore favor a debate limited to the top 
contenders more like the debates in the general election. It is certainly true that differences in 
positions on issues cannot be pursued in any depth when so many candidates try to participate 
in the discussion. Raising your hand in response to a question from the moderator—an 
extreme but symptomatic technique used in 2007—does not provide much enlightenment.
68 
Nevertheless, if we recognize that the more important question in a primary is not the 
difference between candidates on issues but the differences in their constitutional character, 
we might find a more populous forum preferable. It enables candidates to demonstrate how 
well they can deal with challenges from a wider range of opponents. Because constructive 
engagement with the opposition is an indicator of a capability for cooperation, the multi-
candidate debate is often a more revealing test than a format with only two or three candidates.  
This does not mean that the candidates themselves should ignore issues. Even without 
themselves following the substance of the discussion in depth, viewers can tell whether the 
candidates are taking the issues seriously, speaking candidly, taking responsibility for their 
past statements, and displaying other similar qualities that bear on constitutional character. 
Even voters who do not take the issues seriously may still insist that their nominee does.  
Another reason that candidates must try to engage in genuine deliberation about issues 
relates more to the development of the candidates’ character than the voters assessment of it. 
In this respect, the value of the debate is less to inform citizens than to enlighten the 
candidates. We might say that debates help some candidates learn what they believe. In the 
course of a series of debates, candidates refine their positions, find common ground, and 
improve their ability to justify their positions to diverse audiences.
69 They modify their 
positions as they learn how to respond more effectively to the arguments of voters, both 
supporters and opponents. Just as the primary process facilitates voters’ changing their views - 21 - 
over time, so it can encourage candidates to do the same. Thus in the debates, there is a 
division of learning.  Candidates deliberate so that they can learn more about the substance of 
the issues, but citizens observe so that they can learn more about the character of the 
candidates. The candidates learn about issues while the voters learn about the candidates.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The scholarly study and political commentary about the presidential primary process has 
proceeded with little analysis of the principles of democratic theory. Criticisms of the process 
and proposals for reform presuppose those principles, yet the critics and the reformers seldom 
pause to examine what the principles mean, which are most important, and which may be 
neglected. Consequently, not only are some important normative issues slighted, but empirical 
inquiry misses some interesting problems. A case in point is the problem on which I have 
focused here —the potential of the nominating process to enable assessments of the character 
of the candidates. I have suggested that the process can be more democratic not primarily by 
encouraging more participation or competition, but by giving voters greater opportunities to 
judge the democratic commitments of the candidates. 
When we ask how the process helps citizens judge the character of candidates (and 
how it can help candidates develop their character), we see the process in a different light in 
several ways. First, and most generally, voters, candidates and journalists are encouraged to 
pay attention to decisions and practices in the campaign that are relevant to assessing 
candidates but tend to be otherwise neglected. That is a useful corrective even if the primary 
process is remains more or less the same.  Second, when we consider possible reforms, we can 
discover new reasons for supporting changes that some reformers already favor for different 
reasons. The case for a sequential compared to a simultaneous primary is further strengthened 
by noticing that it provides more and better opportunities for voters to learn about a 
candidate’s constitutional character. Third, even if one believes on other grounds the case is 
already strong enough, the character-based considerations can influence the particular form 
the sequential primary should take. The intervals between each primary should be great 
enough, and the whole process long enough, to permit both voters and candidates to learn 
more about constitutional character. Fourth, a character-based perspective puts some 
controversies in a different light. The dispute about superdelegates and the seating of delegates 
from wayward states can be viewed not merely as an episode of strategic maneuvering or not 
even as a problem of deciding which democratic principle should prevail. How the candidates 
handle the dispute itself—whether they find ways to resolve it for the good of the party, for 
example—can be taken as a test of character. Finally, looking at the process from the 
perspective of constitutional character can directly challenge some conventional criticisms. For 
example, horse race coverage turns out to be more valuable than is commonly assumed. 
Debates may be seen not so much as occasions for voters to learn what candidates think about - 22 - 
the issues but more as opportunities for voters to observe how candidates deal with 
disagreement, and whether they themselves learn from the experience.  
Primaries can be proving grounds for candidates to show their commitment to the 
democratic process, or lack thereof.  In this respect, primaries may be even more important 
than general elections. In general election campaigns, partisan commitments and underlying 
predispositions more strongly shape voters’ attitudes, and strategic imperatives more nearly 
determine the candidates’ responses. In primary campaigns, the dynamic possibilities of the 
political process can be more effectively exploited. Candidates have more opportunities to 
show their constitutional character in response to changing circumstances in a series of 
contests. Voters can be more open to changing their judgments of candidates’ character in 
response to fresh revelations. General elections can test character too. But primaries are the 
last clear chance to select candidates who show a firm commitment to the democratic 
process—a commitment that citizens, whatever their partisan persuasions, should demand 
from their presidents, whatever their party. Our nominating process should be designed to 
enable citizens to seize that chance, and help them choose the best nominees, which after all 
should be the primary purpose of primaries. 
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